

01148

1972/12/13

***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ *****S COPY


FLASH
Z 131838Z
FM COLONEL GUAY HAK TO 44

TO THE SITUATION ROOM

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECEMBER 13, 1972
FOR: GENERAL HAIG, THE WHITE HOUSE
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. TODAY'S MEETING CONTINUED THE PATTERN OF THE LAST THREE DAYS, ALBEIT IN MORE LUDICROUS AND INSOLENT FORM. PRIOR TO MY SESSION WITH THO, THE EXPERTS MET AT 9 O'CLOCK OSTENSIBLY TO REAFFIRM THE TEXTS WHICH HAD BEEN CONFORMED YESTERDAY EXCEPT FOR TWO REMAINING ISSUES. IN THE GUISE OF TECHNICAL CHANGES, THEY INTRODUCED HALF A DOZEN MODIFICATIONS.



***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HAIG, HOWE, LORD

PSN:014877

PAGE 01

TDR:348/20:03Z

DTG:131838Z

***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ *****S COPY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 8/25/93 F9301181

By MM NARA, Date 9/14/93

SA 99

***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ *****S COPY

4. AFTER LUNCH TWO TOOK HIS DAILY RUN AT AN UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE 5; AND BOTH AN UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE 8(C) AND SHORTENING THE PERIOD IN THE AGREEMENT TO TWO MONTHS. WE THEN DISCUSSED PROTOCOLS FOR THE FIRST TIME, THEIR HAVING GIVEN THEIR TEXTS ON THE ICCS AND THE FOUR-PARTY/TWO-PARTY COMMISSIONS THE EVENING BEFORE. THEY ALSO GAVE US A PROTOCOL TODAY ON REMOVING MINES WHICH DOESN'T LOOK TOO BAD, AND PROMISED ONE ON PRISONERS TOMORROW MORNING.

***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ *****S COPY

***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ *****S COPY

5. WHERE THEN DOES THIS LEAVE US? I EXPLAINED OUR BASIC DILEMMA YESTERDAY. HANOI IS ALMOST DISDAINFUL OF US BECAUSE WE HAVE NO EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE LEFT, WHILE SAIGON IN ITS SHORT-SIGHTED DEVICES TO SABOTAGE THE AGREEMENT KNOCKS OUT FROM UNDER US OUR FEW REMAINING PROPS. THIEU'S CEASEFIRE OFFER COULD FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION, BECAUSE IF HANOI ACCEPTS IT WE WILL HAVE STOPPED BOMBING NORTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL IN PURSUIT OF OUR PEACE EFFORT WHILE THIEU WOULD HAVE FORCED US TO STOP EVERYWHERE ELSE TO SABOTAGE IT. WE WILL SOON HAVE NO MEANS OF LEVERAGE AT ALL WHILE PRESSURES WILL BUILD UP DOMESTICALLY IF WE FAIL TO REACH AN AGREEMENT OR GET OUR PRISONERS BACK. WE WILL NEITHER GET AN AGREEMENT NOR BE ABLE TO PRESERVE SAIGON.

6. WE NOW HAVE TWO ESSENTIAL STRATEGIC CHOICES. THE FIRST ONE IS TO TURN HARD ON HANOI AND INCREASE PRESSURE ENORMOUSLY THROUGH BOMBING AND OTHER MEANS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE MEASURES LIKE RESEEDING THE MINES, MASSIVE TWO-DAY STRIKES AGAINST THE POWER PLANTS OVER THIS WEEKEND, AND A COUPLE OF B-52 EFFORTS. THIS WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY PAID SOMETHING FOR THESE PAST TEN DAYS. CONCURRENTLY WE WOULD TRY TO LINE UP SAIGON AND AT LEAST PREVENT THIEU FROM MAKING FURTHER UNILATERAL PROPOSALS. PRESSURES ON SAIGON WOULD BE ESSENTIAL SO THAT THIEU DOES NOT THINK HE HAS FACED US DOWN, AND WE CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT ~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WE WILL NOT PUT UP WITH OUR ALLY'S INTRANSIGENCE ANY MORE THAN WE WILL DO SO WITH OUR ENEMY.

THE SECOND COURSE IS TO MAINTAIN PRESENT APPEARANCES BY SCHEDULE ANOTHER MEETING WITH LE DUC THO IN EARLY JANUARY. THIS WOULD TEST THE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY HYPOTHESIS THAT THO MIGHT GET NEW INSTRUCTIONS. IF WE WERE ONCE AGAIN STONEWALLED, WE WOULD THEN TURN HARD ON HANOI. WE WOULD GIVE UP THE CURRENT EFFORT, BLAMING BOTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES BUT PLACING THE MAJOR ONUS ON HANOI. WE WOULD OFFER A BILATERAL DEAL OF WITHDRAWAL AND AN END OF BOMBING FOR PRISONERS. UNDER THIS COURSE AS WELL WE WOULD HAVE TO MOVE ON SAIGON, TO BRING THIEU ABOARD IN THE EVENT OF AN AGREEMENT IN JANUARY OR IN THE LIKELY EVENT OF FAILURE, TO LAY THE BASIS FOR GOING THE BILATERAL ROUTE.

PSN:014877

PAGE 04

TOR:348/20:03Z

DTG:131838Z

***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ *****S COPY

EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

*****S COPY

FLASH
Z 131038Z
FM COLCHEL GUAY HAK TO 44

TO THE SITUATION ROOM

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECEMBER 13, 1972

FOR: GENERAL HAIG, THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. TODAY'S MEETING CONTINUED THE PATTERN OF THE LAST THREE DAYS, ALBEIT IN MORE LUDICROUS AND INSOLENT FORM. PRIOR TO MY SESSION WITH THO, THE EXPERTS MET AT 9 O'CLOCK OSTENSIBLY TO REAFFIRM THE TEXTS WHICH HAD BEEN CONFORMED YESTERDAY EXCEPT FOR TWO REMAINING ISSUES. IN THE GUISE OF TECHNICAL CHANGES, THEY INTRODUCED HALF A DOZEN MODIFICATIONS. THEY REOPENED ARTICLE 7 BY PROPOSING THE DELETION OF THE WORD "DESTROYED", ALLEGEDLY ON LINGUISTIC GROUNDS. THEY STARTED A NEW EFFORT TO WEAKEN ARTICLE 20 (A) CONCERNING LAOS AND CAMBODIA. THEY WANTED TO DELETE ALL BUT ONE REFERENCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN THE TEXT, WHICH IN FACT IS ACCEPTABLE SINCE THE NAME ONLY COMES UP IN INVIDIOUS REFERENCES CONCERNING OUR OISE'S OBLIGATIONS. THEY MAINTAINED MENTION OF THE PRG IN ARTICLE 17.

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HAIG, HOWE, LORD

PSN:014877

PAGE 01

TOR:340/20:03Z

DTG:131038Z

*****~~TOP SECRET~~*****S COPY

(PD)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 1/6/93 F92-1412


By MD NARA, Date 9/13/93

SA 99 (Part)

*****S COPY



5. WHERE THEN DOES THIS LEAVE US? I EXPLAINED OUR BASIC DILEMMA YESTERDAY. HANOI IS ALMOST DISDAINFUL OF US BECAUSE WE HAVE NO EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE LEFT, WHILE SAIGON IN ITS SHORT-SIGHTED DEVICES TO SABOTAGE THE AGREEMENT KNOCKS OUT FROM UNDER US OUR FEW REMAINING PROPS. THIEU'S CEASEFIRE OFFER COULD FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION, BECAUSE IF HANOI ACCEPTS IT WE WILL HAVE STOPPED BOMBING NORTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL IN PURSUIT OF OUR PEACE EFFORT WHILE THIEU WOULD HAVE FORCED US TO STOP EVERYWHERE ELSE TO SABOTAGE IT. WE WILL SOON HAVE NO MEANS OF LEVERAGE AT ALL WHILE PRESSURES WILL BUILD UP DOMESTICALLY IF WE FAIL TO REACH AN AGREEMENT OR GET OUR PRISONERS BACK. WE WILL NEITHER GET AN AGREEMENT NOR BE ABLE TO PRESERVE SAIGON.



PSN:014877

PAGE 04

TDR:348/20:03Z

DTG:131038Z

***** ~~T H P~~ S E C R E T *****S COPY